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ANTHONY D'AMATO*

PERSPECTIVES

International Human Rights
at the Close of the
Twentieth Century**
We are in the midst of the human rights revolution, perhaps the most
important development in the cultural history of homo sapiens. In the
United States since 1945 equal rights for blacks, via the civil rights movement, and equal rights for women, via the movement toward the Equal
Rights Amendment, have fundamentally altered our perceptions and our
laws. Internationally, the Nuremberg trials following World War II removed the shield that officials thought they had when they adopted and
implemented genocidal policies directed against religious or ethnic minorities. The cause of human rights has since moved to issues that are
perhaps less dramatic, but nevertheless may be broader in scope.
In this essay I would like to speculate as to why the human-rights
revolution is increasingly likely to dominate our foreign-policy attentions
in the decades to come. Then I want to venture some predictions, of
particular interest perhaps to international lawyers, about where I think
the cause of international human rights is heading. My purpose is simply
to help increase awareness and sensitivity about these matters. Of course,
prediction is anybody's guess, and as Richard Falk remarked at a recent
panel of the American Society of International Law, the hardest thing of
all to predict is the future.
I. Human Rights and Realpolitik
While militarily weak states have a stake in peacefulness secured by
international law, militarily powerful states have a different motivation
for accepting the rule of law throughout the world. Militarily powerful
states are not themselves vulnerable to attack, but their citizens who travel
outside their borders are vulnerable. Yet travel abroad is a necessity: a
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state first of all must send ambassadors abroad; it also sends other diplomatic and consular personnel; its political leaders on occasion travel
abroad; it may have soldiers stationed on bases in other countries; its
performing artists may be visiting other countries; its students may be
studying in foreign universities; its news reporters may be investigating
news events or sports events abroad; many of its citizens may be touring
abroad; and last but not least, it will have vast commercial dealings abroad
as its businesspersons engage in trade on the world market and investment
in other countries, and as multinational corporations proliferate. All these
people are vulnerable. Even if their home country has a huge stockpile
of nuclear weapons, those weapons will be next to useless in the face of
illegal incarceration in a foreign prison or kidnapping by a terrorist organization. As the United States learned as a result of the outrageous
taking of diplomatic hostages in Tehran in 1979 and the kidnappings of
ordinary citizens in Lebanon in the mid-1980s, vast military power and
nuclear superiority count for very little in terms of getting those citizens
back home safely.
Militarily powerful states are increasingly recognizing the vulnerability
represented by their citizens who venture across their boundaries. This
recognition comes largely as the result of the single most powerful force
of the twentieth century: the power of the media, especially television,
to create instant empathy for individuals who are in trouble in foreign
lands. An American in trouble abroad is not merely an isolated adventurer
off on a personal frolic; rather, the individual is a part of this country just
as Rhode Island is a part of this country. This perception that a country
is not confined to its own territory but rather travels abroad when its
citizens travel abroad is heightened by the recognition of the importance
of businesspersons engaging in trade abroad to help the consumer at home
in an increasingly interdependent world economy. The cultural values of
tourism also feed into a nation's perception of its own worth. Nations
increasingly are perceiving individuals who engage in entrepreneurial activities abroad as persons whose activities have a national-interest component as well as the more obvious personal-profit motive.
As a result, the creation of a world where basic human rights are respected is increasingly important to militarily powerful states. The rhetoric in the United States associated with Henry Kissinger and the "national
security" hardliners is beginning to sound stale. The United States is not
militarily vulnerable to a hostile takeover by any other nation; we do not
need military help from others in the form of collective security pacts as
far as our own national security is concerned. Nevertheless, our citizens
traveling abroad desperately need the protection of the international law
of human rights.
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Even as the human-rights issue becomes increasingly real to Americans,
signs of a thaw are emerging in the Soviet Union, where the "national
security" hardliners predominate to a far greater extent than in the United
States. The initiatives known as glasnost represent a perception, almost
at the eleventh hour, that the cause of international human rights is consistent with, and not inimical to, the fundamental interests of the Soviet
state. Naturally the hardliners there, as here, resist these trends. It is not
simply a clich6 that generals are trained to fight the last war. Military
leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union have a World War
II complex that probably will not pass until all those persons who experienced that war are gone from the scene. The Soviet Union still plans
for, and fears, an armored invasion eastward from Europe. The anachronism is as striking as the Kissinger-type strategists in the United States
talking about the international balance of power as if we still lived in the
time of Metternich, discussing nuclear weapons that can be used "tactically," and plotting nuclear exchanges that can be "contained."
The biggest defect in the hardliner view of the world is the failure to
recognize that even on the assumption that this is a bipolar world with
the two superpowers locked in a military staredown for immense stakes,
the reason for the increasing success of American influence in the world
since the 1950s is not that we have a few more nuclear submarines than
they, or a few more bases, or that their ICBMs have forced us to draw
together NATO and SEATO powers in tight collective security alliances.
Rather, what has occurred is the inherent and natural power of the free
market system to spread by itself. Private property has won over collective property, a lesson Stalin refused to learn when he butchered ten
million Russian farmers who did not quite fit into his notion of agrarian
reform. So long as the Soviet Union competed against us in third-world
markets by the use of state-owned enterprises that were soon perceived
as the advance guard of potential military domination, we were able to
out-compete for those markets and allegiances even though the technology
proffered by the Soviets was artificially subsidized. In short, our commercial initiatives since World War II have gained ground against communist-sponsored offerings even though the communist nations could offer
a more attractive price. Uncommitted and third-world nations have perceived that the lower price was too high if it meant vulnerability to Soviet
influence and control. Of course, the new glasnost initiatives are a sign
that the USSR has finally realized the futility of their previous approaches.
If this means more effective competition for the United States, we should
welcome it; we have considerable expertise dealing in competitive markets.
Even as the Soviets are beginning to realize the need to move toward
individual economic rights as a way of competing in the world markets,
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the United States is beginning to realize the deep affinity between a free
market and human rights. As recently as the Nixon and Ford administrations, international human rights were considered an annoyance in the
foreign-policy realm. Support for the Shah of Iran was predicated on a
Kissinger-type notion of collective military security that refused to acknowledge human-rights atrocities committed by the Shah or the rising
discontent of the Iranian people living in a police state. The Carter administration was a transitional period. In perhaps his most historically memorable utterance, Jimmy Carter said that human rights is the "soul" of
American foreign policy. Yet inconsistently he continued support for the
Shah (including allowing the Iranian police to practice their brutal methods
within the United States itself), a policy that led to the downfall of his
administration. Under President Reagan, with inconsistencies here and
there, human rights has increasingly occupied center stage in our dealings
with other countries. The administration's present stance against Pinochet
of Chile would hardly have been imaginable fifteen years ago, and the
toppling of Marcos in the Philippines and Duvalier in Haiti are truly
historic signs of nails in Metternich's coffin. (Of course, those in the
administration who have been frustrated with these events found a ready
channel for their activities in supporting the contras in Nicaragua. This
was pure we-versus-them military adventurism, inimical to human rights.
But given the current Irangate investigations and prosecutions, even this
siphon for realpolitik energy bids to be clamped off.)
Elsewhere I have attempted to spell out the deep affinity between free
markets and human rights.' Suffice it to say here that a free world market
relies upon individual units (persons, corporations) competing with each
other to maximize products and services that other individual units desire.
The profit motive that constitutes the engine driving the free market only
works when the heavy hand of government and bureaucracy is absent,
as Eastern bloc countries have learned to their dismay. A free market
requires recognition of private worth; the individual units making up the
market engage alternatively in production and consumption, activities that
would be senseless were it not for a recognition that the purpose is the
satisfaction of individual wants and not the fulfillment of some abstruse
ideology. In contrast to free markets is pervasive regulation by government which, as Ayn Rand so convincingly demonstrated in her many
works, can only be accomplished by legions of bureaucrats. Bureaucrats,
as Rand demonstrated, do not produce; they merely consume. Hence the
more bureaucrats per capita (which we loosely call "big government"),
the more the nonbureaucrats are enslaved to feed, clothe, and house the

I. See A.
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bureaucrats. To justify their existence, bureaucrats arrogate decisional
authority to themselves and progressively reduce the sphere of freedom
and human dignity of the nonbureaucrats. Thus the clash of free markets
versus bureaucratic control parallels the clash of human rights versus
2
dictatorship.
The free enterprise system will not of itself ensure the fruition of all
human rights. Irving Kristol's phrase, "Two cheers for capitalism!" is
instructive. It has long been evident that free markets need the sort of
limited regulation that enables them to remain free. Without antitrust laws,
for example, business combinations can become so powerful as to extend
their drive toward monopolization into the political realm, thus subverting
the free market at its central nervous system. Fine-tuning the law to serve
free enterprise by keeping it free, while avoiding excess regulation that
leads to dependence on governmental, and hence bureaucratic, largesse,
is a specialized job for those who know and understand the law. Let us
turn, then, to the fine-tuning necessary in the international arena as we
look ahead to some of the major problems of the end of the millennium.
I1. Human Rights Issue-Areas
Human rights problems are not the only, nor the major, problems facing
our small green planet. We live under the constant threat of nuclear destruction. We are in danger of depleting the fragile ozone layer that miraculously shields us from the sun's deadly ultraviolet rays. We are
destroying our tropical rain forests and thus may create an irreversible
imbalance in the life-sustaining components of our atmosphere. AIDS and
perhaps mutations of the AIDS virus are life threats to our species. These
are extremely real, extremely serious, and unique threats to the human
race (whose existence, so far, is measured in the thousands of years,
compared to the dinosaurs who ruled the earth for a hundred million years
and then were totally wiped out). To talk, then, about human rights seems
to focus on a problem of less than vital import. Yet we have to operate
on all fronts. And the human rights problems are serious enough.
A.

PROBLEMS OF ASSOCIATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY

The major cause of strife and bloodshed in the past few centuries has
been, to put it simply, the clash between the desire of some people to live

and associate exclusively in a given territory with "their own kind," and
2. The Soviet Union is, today, the biggest bureaucracy in human history. One can better
understand the nature of the Soviet government if one thinks in terms of bureaucracyeven in the abbreviated and simplistic terms given in the text above-than if one gets
sidetracked by hundreds of volumes of Marxist-Leninist theory.
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those who resist such associational exclusivities. The terms "prejudice"
and "intolerance" can apply equally to both groups. Insiders can be said
to be prejudiced against people not of their own kind, while outsiders can
be said to be prejudiced against people who want exclusivity of association. Hence terms such as "prejudice," "intolerance," and "discrimination," although widely used in humam-rights discourse, do not get us
very far analytically.
Another term much used in this context is "self-determination," which
is also more of a rhetorical than an analytical tool. Under the banner of
self-determination, empires have been dismantled, former colonies have
become states, and the number of independent nations in the world is
higher than ever before. Despite such exercises of self-determination,
however, minorities in many nations today cry for their political selfdetermination or some degree of autonomy. 3 Yet, as Ivor Jennings stated
the analytical question, "the people cannot decide until somebody decides
who are the people." 4 If there is a plebiscite, who decides who is to
participate in it? Should the decision be made according to geographic
area, or according to some authority that determines who the "indigenous" people are? Professor Pomerance, who has given careful thought
to this problem, concludes that if self-determination means anything, it
signifies a continuum of rights. One must maximize individual as well as
group rights while respecting the rights of other individuals and collectivities: "Alternatives such as federal schemes, autonomous regimes, minority rights, guarantees of non-discrimination, and the right of option,
may present themselves as reasonable and just solutions in some
5
instances.'
Perhaps, analytically, no "self-determination" right as such exists because of the intractable problem of determining who is entitled to selfdetermination. Nevertheless, we still should listen to and evaluate claims
for self-determination when minority individuals and groups claim that
they have been discriminated against with regard to their human rights.
The self-determination problem thus transmutes into the problem of securing respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. We can have
more sympathy for groups seeking self-determination if their complaint
is that their basic human rights (other than claims of associational exclusivity) are not being respected. Then we may perhaps put aside the selfdetermination matter and see whether, if respect for their human rights

3. See Hannum & Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, 74 AM. J.

L. 858 (1980).
4. 1. JENNINGS, THE

INT'L

APPOACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

55 (1956), quoted in Pomerance,

Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal, 19 ISR. L. REV. 310, 311 (1984).

5. Id. at 337.
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is established, they might decide that associational exclusivity is not what
they really wanted after all. The challenge for international scholars is to
work their way out of the self-determination morass by seeing if focusing
upon basic human rights and freedoms will either dissolve the problem
or at least suggest the merits of alternative political solutions.
B. THE RIGHT TO SUBSISTENCE

Many international conventions contain provisions on the right to food,
to shelter, and to clothing. 6 I suggest we view them as a single right: the
right to subsistence. Every human being born into this world has a powerful claim on the rest of us to that minimal share of resources that will
barely sustain its life. Extremists on one side will say that that is not
enough; justice requires that we share more of our resources with those
who are extremely poor. 7 Extremists on the other side will say that no
government has the right to take away any of our property to distribute
it to the poor, even if the poor as a consequence will starve to death. The
debate will not progress if it polarizes at these extreme positions. Instead,
the world needs to develop a minimalist theory advocating a right to bare
subsistence, but only bare subsistence, even at the expense of invading
the property of others through taxation. Customary international law is
moving in this direction.
A right to subsistence is a right that only, and necessarily, attaches to
people who need minimal subsistence in order to survive. It does not
attach to the states where those people are located. Thus, if a rich nation
A distributes food to a poor nation B, the government officials of B would
be guilty of a criminal violation of international law (under the theory
advocated here) if they then fail to distribute the food free of charge to
their citizens. Hence, the subsistence theory has "bite" in that it applies
to all states, including the home states of the people who need subsistence.
Many lawyers fear that the adoption of multilateral conventions proclaiming a right to subsistence would infringe upon the freedom of individuals to be charitable or not to be charitable as they see fit, and also
make an unprincipled inroad into the right of private property. These are
legitimate fears and can be briefly addressed.

6. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (Annex), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into

force Jan. 3, 1976).
7. This is, in a sense, Rawls's theory of justice applied to the world as a whole instead
of, as Rawls limited it, to a single country. I have offered elsewhere a critique of the Rawlsian
position when it is thus extended, concluding that the extension points up some basic flaws

in the theory itself even as applied to a single society. See A.
A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW 259-76 (1984).
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First, it is certainly true in one sense that coerced charity is not charity.
However, suppose a group of people feel that a certain charity is important. Even if all the members of the group are urged to contribute, some
will hold out on the assumption that the others will take care of the
problem. To avoid the "free-riders," the group enacts legislation requiring
everyone to contribute. It is hard for a potential free-rider to oppose that
to which in principle he has agreed. Hence, the resulting law makes it
possible to avoid free-riders by requiring a contribution from everyone.
The same reasoning can be applied to address effectively the problem of
people starving to death. Participation in multilateral conventions is a free
choice that results in group charity, but for a noble end.
Second, the inroad into private property is in principle a fear that accompanies any taxation for social welfare. Taxation for social welfare is,
at bottom, robbing Peter to pay Paul; its philosophic justification is that
Peter agreed to it by participating in a democracy that was sensitive to Paul's
basic needs. Its practical justification is more interesting. A tax that is in
reality a transfer payment (that is, taking from Peter to pay Paul) only works
if it is a minor tax. If the tax gets too large, Peter stops earning income, sits
back, and joins Paul in wanting to be paid. Clearly, Peter needs a sufficient
incentive to produce so that he chooses production over passive consumption. The difference cannot be small, however. For example, Peter
can get ajob that pays $500 per week. If he is taxed $200, and the $200 is
paid over to Paul, Peter gets only $300 for working compared to $200 that
he would get for not working. Peter will undoubtedly choose not to work.
Then, with Peter having joined Paul in the ranks of the unemployed, Mary,
who is working, has to pay a higher transfer tax. If Mary makes $500 a
week, she may have to pay $250 in order to support all the Peters and Pauls
who are not working. Mary then quits, because she nets only $250 a week
for working while she can get $250 a week for not working. At this point,
everyone stops working. No income is left to tax.
Hence, the transfer payments have to be slight enough to keep nearly
all the workers in the labor pool and nearly all the entrepreneurs in business. If the transfer payments are going outside the country (as they would
in the case of providing subsistence to starving people abroad), the tolerable amount has to be quite small in order for the transfer payment
system to function at all. The transfer payments can be larger if the funds
are kept within the country (as in Social Security, unemployment, and
welfare taxation in the United States) because the money that is paid over
to the recipients is soon spent and finds its way back into the economy,
increasing the gross income of those who are working. 8
8. Suppose there is a maximal percentage amount, X, for an ideal transfer payment. X
then is the amount of tax when the payments are made abroad, with XI representing the
VOL. 22, NO. I
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Another way to express this result, using morality instead of economics,
is that a universal system of human rights must respect the right of a
person to the fruits of his or her own labor equally with the right of another
person not to starve to death. We are enslaved to the extent that the fruits
of our labor are taken away from us. We can tolerate minimal enslavement
to save children from starving, but moral imperatives would begin to lose
their force if pressed much beyond that point. Since starvation is a Malthusian check upon runaway population growth, any moral imperative
that we allow ourselves to be taxed to save children from starvation would
have to accommodate our insistence upon non-Malthusian alternatives
such as education in family planning and birth control to go along with
the free food.
Nations are already moving, in fitful steps, toward such a solution. In
my view, this movement is a sign of our increased cultural awareness. If
children are starving to death in any part of the world, I have a moral
obligation to do something about it. The role for lawyers is to make what
I do much more effective than my sending a CARE package that might
wind up being confiscated and sold by some government officials for their
own benefit at the dock of the receiving country. I would not feel tremendously coerced if a small tax were levied upon me and upon everyone
else, if I knew that the proceeds would really go, one hundred percent,
to prevent actual starvation.
C.

THE RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO FAMILY SUPPORT AND NURTURE

Going beyond bare subsistence, infants and children need family support and nurture. While there is no feasible nor desirable way to require
adults to take care of needy infants, throughout the world many childless
couples are eager to adopt and raise children. Unfortunately, at the same
time, countless infants and children are starving to death. Many of these
are orphaned or abandoned; others presently have parents who are also
starving and who would be willing, for the children's sake, to give them
up for adoption. An uncluttered view of human rights would seem to
indicate that the requirement here is simply to match needy children with
willing foster parents. It follows that governments should assist in the
distribution of needy children in their own countries to willing foster
parents in any foreign country.
tax on the income 1. Within the country, the amount is (X + k)l. However, the additional
amount, k, then gets funnelled back into the economy, increasing the income of those who
are taxed, so that the effective tax is (X + k) (I + kM), and thus if an appropriate increment
to income, M, is chosen that reflects the purchasing power of the recipients of the transfer
payments, the net effect is the same in the external and internal cases, i.e., (X + k) I =
(X + k) (I + kM).
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Governments are reluctant to do this. They do not want to admit that
their own people are starving or that they cannot provide subsistence to
their own citizens; they do not want to see their future generations being
shipped off to other countries. As a result they throw roadblocks into the
transnational adoption process, or corrupt officials demand exorbitant
bribes. Nor are the receiving governments more cooperative. They maintain immigration quotas which, whatever the justification (if any) such
quotas might have for alien adults, are extraordinarily cruel when applied
to infants from abroad who need adoption. In this area of human rights,
then, what is needed is an articulation of the child's right to family support
and nurture, an examination of its status under evolving customary international law, and a realization that the offenders here may be the traditional subjects and objects of international law: states themselves. Then
we have to beg, cajole, or shame the governments into putting into place
effective transnational adoption procedures.
D.

CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

When one contemplates the vast problems associated with the foregoing
human-rights issues-the right to subsistence, the right to a family, and
associational exclusivities-one is tempted to say that the more "Western" assertions of civil and political rights pale by comparison. Yet it is
unfair to weigh sets of human rights. It is clear that Western support for
human rights depends on regarding political and civil rights at least on a
par with economic and social rights.
The right to subsistence is certainly "basic," yet that overworked term
can also be applied to the right of habeas corpus. The need for governments
to distribute food to starving people is "basic," but so is the free-speech
right of people to criticize governments. In the Brecht-Weill musical drama
The Threepenny Opera there is the line, "First feed the face, and then
talk right and wrong." In one sense, though, we have to talk right and
wrong before we can persuade anyone to feed the face.
It is amazing that, on the one hand, the more that governments tolerate
criticism by their citizens, the more the citizens regard the governments
as legitimate; and yet the more that governments allow free speech, the
more governmental elites resent being criticized and do what they can
(and the less democratic the regime, the more they can do) to suppress
speech. This tension reflects a basic urge on the part of some governmental
elites toward Caesarism-to experience power as a function of the arbitrariness and repressiveness of their rule. In this respect, freedom of
speech is the most fundamental human right, because it acts as a check,
through ridicule and exposure as well as debate, upon the tendency toward

VOL. 22, NO. I

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS-20TH CENTURY

177

governmental excess and runaway power accumulation. The inquiries into
Watergate and Irangate were not diseases of the American system, but
rather triumphs. The American people may have ended up trusting politicians less, but their trust of the political process must have increased.
It takes a healthy political process to expose lawbreaking government
officials.
The more free speech and self-criticism that takes place in some countries, the more likely it is to spread, through the media and, by example,
to other countries. Scholars of international customary law should react
to attempts by some governments to jam the airwaves and keep out unwelcome television signals; these practices, under the name of national
sovereignty, are a direct affront to basic political and civil rights. The
world in the twenty-first century-if we survive the threat of nuclear
devastation-could either be a people-first democratic world or a government-first totalitarian world, and the tendency toward either extreme
could easily tip one way or the other at any time. Our first notice that
the scales are tipping in the wrong direction is when leaders call for the
temporary abridgment of basic civil or political rights. They always have
a popular cause at hand, and the passions of the moment are with them,
but to go along with them ciould be an irreversible mistake. In this respect,
the more we are part of an international comprehensive system of civil
and political rights, secured through multilateral conventions, the harder
it will be for local officials to be able to abridge them. That is our payoff
right here at home. Our payoff abroad, as I mentioned earlier in this essay,
is that when freedom spreads to other lands, our nation becomes more
secure in the things that we value most.
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